Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 28
Issue 4 October 1995

Article 7

1995

Biodiversity: Opportunities and Obligations
Jeffrey P. Kushan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biodiversity: Opportunities and Obligations, 28 Vanderbilt Law Review 755 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol28/iss4/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL
OF

TRANSNATIONAL LAW
VOLUME 28

OCTOBER 1995

NUMBER 4

SYMPosIuM:

Biodiversity: Opportunities and
Obligations
Introduction
JonathanI. Charney*
This issue of the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw is
devoted to the Symposium on Biological Diversity that was
convened by the Journal at the Vanderbilt University School of
Law on January 20-21, 1995. The focus of the Symposium was
the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 1 Biological
diversity is a relatively new term in international law and
relations. The Biological Diversity Convention was one of the

products of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) that was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in
June of 1992.2 Since the Convention was a product of UNCED,
its substance was influenced by the trends surrounding the entire
UNCED process.
The Biological Diversity Convention entered into force on
December 29, 1993, after 30 states ratified it. 3 By the time the
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., 1965, New York
University; J.D., 1968, University of Wisconsin.
Opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
1.
Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].
2.
For the texts of all the products of UNCED and an overview of the
Conference, see United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 31
I.L.M. 814 (1992).
3.
Biodiversity Treaty Enters Into Force 18 Months After Approval at Earth
Summit, 17 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 12, 1994).
*
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first conference of the parties was held a year later,4 there were
106 parties and 30 observer states.5 Initially, the United States
did not sign the Convention and has not yet become a party. The
Bush Administration opposed the Convention, 6 but the Clinton
Administration signed the Convention and submitted it to the
United States Senate for its advice and consent subject to certain
understandings. 7 For some in the United States, the Convention
is controversial.
The Symposium examined the Convention and issues raised
by it from a global perspective and from a domestic United States
perspective.
Although this is a law school journal, the
Symposium organizers wisely included on the program not only
lawyers (from academia and government) but also persons from
other disciplines, including economics, statistics, and business.
Participants in the audience contributed views from other
disciplines.
The Biological Diversity Convention is one of the many new
developments in the field of international environmental law. The
field is growing rapidly in response to international recognition
that industrial development of all states often has some adverse
consequences on the human race and the earth's biosphere. As
Professor Bodansky explains, the Biological Diversity Convention
is linked to and incorporates many of the new legal developments.
Thus, the Convention is part of a larger global effort to develop
new international law that, in turn, affects the overall relations
among states. Of particular importance are the desires of less
developed countries (LDC's) to develop economically and the
problems associated with population growth and poverty. These
issues form the background for understanding the Convention on

Biological Diversity.

4.

The Conference was required by the Convention.

Biodiversity

Convention, supranote 1, art. 23.
5.
Catherine Tinker, Responsibility For Biological Diversity Conservation
UnderInternationalLaw, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 777 (1995). An up-to-date list
of all ratifiers of the Convention can be found on the World-Wide Web at
http:/www.unep.ch/bio/ratif.html.
6.
United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment
Programme Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992).
7.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention on Biological Diversity, with annexes, done at Rio de Janeiro on June
5, 1992, and signed by the United States in New York on June 4, 1993, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 20, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994). See U.S. Signs Biodiversity Treaty,
Urges Global Patent ProtectionForBiotech, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 432 (June 16,
1993) (discussing understandings such as patent protection and safety guidelines
for biotechnology); Biodiversity Treaty Unlikely to Get U.S. Senate Nod in 1995,
White House Says, 18 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 172 (March 8,1995) (discussing the
argument over the need for a biosafety protocol).
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Perhaps it is first necessary to identify the object of biological
The United States adopted at an early date the
diversity.
At the international level, the
Endangered Species Act. 8
international community adopted the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species. 9 These approaches to the issue
focus on the protection of specific species that are apparently
going extinct. A related but narrower focus would be one that
addresses specific species that are apparently facing extinction
and that politically important actors view as valuable for historic
or emotional reasons, such as the spotted owl, and, thus, serve as
"icons."
The participants in the Symposium agreed that the Biological
Diversity Convention does not take this approach. Rather, its
focus is on maintaining genetic diversity. The purpose of the
Convention is to preserve for use by humankind a genetic library
that could provide genetic information that can be used, for
example, to preserve crops, to develop pharmaceuticals, or to
otherwise fight disease. In addition, it is believed that this genetic
library will better assure the stability of the earth's ecosystem as
a whole. This approach immediately raises the question of how

one defines and identifies this genetic diversity and then makes it
operational. This issue was addressed by Dr. Solow, who argued
that preservation should be based upon the genetic distance
between various species. He would exclude, as a goal of the

Convention, the saving of specific endangered species for their
own sake. Rather, he would focus on saving those species that
Admittedly, this approach
provide optimal genetic diversity.

contains many uncertainties. Science does not have all the data
necessary to know the genetic composition of the different species
extant today. Nor have scientists systematically measured the
distances between the genetic composition of most known species.
Nevertheless, the objective is clear, its implementation, however,
is more difficult. This approach presents other difficulties. It
may conflict with politically powerful icons supported by specific
groups and it requires one to make hard triage decisions when
species may be facing extinction.
The value of this approach, however, is apparent, especially if
one assumes that all species cannot be preserved forever. By
preserving the optimal diversity of the genetic library, human

8.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884

(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1994); 16 U.S.C. §§ 460k-i, 4601-9, 668dd, 715i,
715s, 1362, 1371, 1372, 1402, 1531-43 (1988)).
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
9.
Fauna and Flora, opened for signatureMar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S.

243 (entered into force July 1, 1975).
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survival may be best preserved. Not only is it more likely that
important crops will be saved through the development of disease
resistant strains, but human lives may be saved as well. Genetic
harvesting may develop necessary pharmaceutical products and,
perhaps, new materials that may be used to genetically engineer
new lifesaving treatments for human or animal diseases, and
crops upon which human civilization depends.
In pursuing this objective, one must consider the entities that
would have to implement this approach. The international
community is composed primarily of nation states. They are the
principal decision makers in this community, although
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and transnational
corporations (TNC's) play an increasingly important role. The
most important development of the Biological Diversity
Convention in dealing with the implementation problem stressed
by the Symposium participants is that the Convention makes it
clear that nation states have intellectual property rights in the
genetic material found within their borders.1 0 This was the
principal focus of the paper presented by Mr. Kushan of the
United States Office of Patents and Trademarks. Intellectual
property rights provide states with an economic interest in the
preservation and commercial development of that material. As
Professor Russell emphasizes, it internalizes the value of genetic
information and makes it economically valuable for the state to
protect and preserve the resource. States have the right to sell
that genetic material and the right to condition that sale.
Recognizing the intellectual property rights of nation states
also has advantages to the genetic prospector. It enables the
genetic prospector to contract with the state for the right to
prospect for the genetic material under predictable terms,
including security of tenure over the duration of the contract.
The prospector also can contract for the exclusive right to the
resource and protection against undesired disclosure to
competitors. The primary disadvantage to genetic prospectors is
that, through this development, they will no longer be able to
engage in the practice of unilaterally taking (legally or illegally) for
their own use genetic material located in foreign states. While
that type of access had its short term advantages to the
prospector, its disadvantages were its lack of exclusivity, long
term rights, and motivation on the part of the host state to
protect and preserve the genetic resources located in its territory
(not to speak of the potential illegality of some of these practices).
The advantages of recognizing the intellectual property rights
of nation states to genetic resources were made particularly clear

10.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 15.1.
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by Mr. Asebey, a businessman who is directly involved in

harvesting genetic material in Latin America for use in the
production of new pharmaceutical products. In his business, the
harvesting is painstaking, requiring the gathering and testing of
large quantities of materials over a long period of time.
Considerable support is required from the local community and
the monetary returns, if any, are not expected before the lapse of
ten years, or more.
The stability of contractual relations,
assurance of rights, and local native support help to make the
conduct of the enterprise economically viable.
There is, of course, the risk that the host state will overreach
by seeking unjustified monetary payments, transfer of technology,
premature access to information, or the right to disclose
confidential information. While the Convention addresses the
transfer of technology and empowers states to seek contracts that
maximize their own objectives, nothing in the Convention requires
the transfer of any technology. Interested businesses are free to
refuse terms or refuse to conclude agreements with states that
overreach."
The interests of the state in obtaining economic
value for its genetic resources and the interests of business
persons in harvesting genetic resources found within that state,
however, should lead to reasonable negotiations that will be
mutually acceptable to both government and industry. Of course,
there are risks that a negotiator will seek to overreach and an
agreement will not be concluded. While negotiations may fail in
the short term, it is likely that the alternatives available to both
sides will promote optimal solutions. Furthermore, this route
seems to be preferred because it may be the only way to promote
the protection of genetic diversity.
As many of the participants in the Symposium made clear,
not only was the Biological Diversity Convention associated with
the UNCED process but it must be viewed in the context of
current developments in international environmental law. We
find within the Convention concepts and approaches that are
pervasive in modem international environmental law. In fact,
they might be viewed as the sine qua non of modem international
environmental law. The Convention promotes the objectives of
monitoring 12 and sustainable development' 3 that will provide the
optimal production of natural resources for human consumption
in the context of a holistic approach to the environment. Its
objective is to assure resources are available that are necessary to

11.
12.
13.

Id. arts. 16, 19.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 6.
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maintain the biosystem as a whole. The Convention also includes

concepts such as the precautionary principle 14 and equity for
future generations. is
Additionally, environmental impact
assessments are required. 16 While states are the primary actors,
participation by other actors such as NGO's and TNC's is
permitted, 17 as Professor Tinker and Ms. Kimball emphasized. In
general, states are obligated to cooperate and coordinate their
actions to promote the objectives of the Convention.' 8 Sharing of
information and technology is often critical in this regard. 19
Implementation is to be accomplished not only through the
universal approach of the Convention but through regional and
local organizations, which are crucial to effective accomplishment
20
of its goals.
Not only does the Convention track many of the concepts
used in other areas of international environmental law, but the
Convention's objectives are promoted separately through other
international agreements that share its objectives. Ms. Kimball
and Professor Joyner especially stressed the critical role that the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 l plays in this regard.
Support is also found in the Madrid Protocol, 22 the London
Dumping Convention,2 3 Marpol, 2 4 the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change,2 s the Ozone Convention and its
protocols, 26 the Basel Convention, 2 7 and a large number of

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

pmbl., para. 9.
pmbl., para. 23.
art. 14.
pmbl., para. 14, arts. 13, 25.
arts. 17, 18.
arts. 17, 18.

20.

Id. pmbl., para. 14.

21.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994). For a list of parties to the Convention as of November 16,
1994, see UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN: SPECIAL ISSUE IV 29-39 (Nov.
16, 1994). By the end of 1994 there were seventy-one parties. 36 LIMITS IN'TE.
SEAS 171-80 (1995).
An up to date listing is available on the internet at
gopher.vm.org.
22.
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1461.
23.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
24.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, opened for
signature June 1, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546.
25.
May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 851.
26.
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, March 22,
1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
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regional environmental and fisheries agreements identified by
Professor Joyner. As a consequence, many of the environmental
objectives of the Biological Diversity Convention also are promoted
by various international agreements designed to protect and
preserve the global environment.
Unfortunately, the Biological Diversity Convention itself does
not contain many hard law rules. It is primarily a framework
convention, as are the other products of UNCED. In the future,
however, more specific agreements are likely to evolve that
implement the broad soft law goals set out in the Convention. It
may also mean that, as Mr. Ward predicted, being a new frontier
in international law, some controversy and changes in direction
can be expected before all of the details of the Convention are
fully resolved by the international community.
This will be
particularly true in the context of fully defining the nature of the
intellectual property rights held by states in genetic resources
within their territories and the relationship of that right to the
general and conventional international law of intellectual

property.
Ms. Kimball, however, provides us with an agenda for the
future.
She recommends that the Convention parties first
concentrate on developing guidelines and practices along with
data gathering and analyses. These will be critical to developing
an effective system for preserving biological diversity and will
provide guidance for states and other actors with limited
resources at their command. Complementing these developments
must be the development of local and regional organizations with
linkages to the global system. The Convention can be most
effective in creating linkages among these organizations, serving
as a clearinghouse for information and expertise.
At the end of the Symposium an open roundtable discussion
was held. This discussion focused specifically on the interests of
the United States in regard to the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Some have charged that the Convention is antihuman
because it preferences the protection and preservation of
nonhuman living organisms to the detriment of humans. Others
fear that the Convention promotes the interests of the LDC's to
the detriment of the developed countries (DC's), such as the
United States. This is said to be accomplished especially by
recognizing intellectual property rights for the LDC's in genetic

Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550; Adjustments and Amendments to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 539.
27.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
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resources within their territories when, previously, DC industries
did not have to recognize these claims. Still, it is not clear how
the Convention will be implemented, and whether it will be fair
and provide optimal protection for biological diversity.
Furthermore, costs to the United States may include required
payments to maintain biological diversity and the transfer of
technology.
The participants in the roundtable generally agreed that the
Convention was in the best interest of the United States and that
the negative arguments described above were either incorrect or
unimportant. The participants expressed the view that the United
States has a long term interest in preserving biological diversity
through genetic diversity and that the Convention makes a
positive contribution towards that objective. For the most part,
the LDC's do hold the storehouse of genetic material that the
United States and the rest of the world need to preserve. By
providing states with an economic interest in the form of an
intellectual property right, they will be economically motivated to
make optimal use of those resources by protecting them and
marketing them wisely. In turn, the Convention, gives DC
industry, which is interested in harvesting those resources, a
legal structure within which to negotiate business arrangements.
It also places an economic value on their handling those
resources pursuant to wise economic practices. This marketbased approach was considered by the participants to be the most
effective way of protecting the genetic resources that human
civilization requires. Thus, the system is designed for the optimal
benefit of human civilization; other living species are not
preferenced over the interests of the human race.
United States party status was considered necessary to
maximize its own interests. As was discussed previously, the
Convention is merely a framework convention and will evolve in
the future. Only if the United States is a party and actively
participates in future negotiations will it be able to exert its full
influence on this evolution and produce solutions it prefers.
Furthermore, modem international environmental law often
enforces its rules against nonparticipants by exclusion. The
United States nonparty status therefore may preclude it and its
companies from gaining access to genetic resources found in
other nation states. As a consequence, U.S. industry will be
disadvantaged economically and technologically because foreign
companies will have that access. While U.S. companies can
establish foreign subsidiaries that can gain access under the flags
of other countries, disadvantages to the Unites States will be
realized in the loss of domestic profits, taxes, jobs, and industry
leadership. Finally, although the Biological Diversity Convention
calls for the exchange of information, technical and scientific
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cooperation, as well as access to and transfer of technology, it
contains no compulsory transfer of technology. 28 Nor is there any
requirement that proprietary information be divulged to other
states.
The Convention also includes general obligations to
provide financial resources to LDC's to promote biological
29
diversity, but the requirements are unspecified and soft.
The Convention takes a free market, human-based approach
to the optimal protection of the earth's genetic resources for the
benefit of all humankind. Before the objectives of this framework
convention are fully realized, much work will be required for the
Convention regime to evolve. There is much uncertainty in this
area, especially due to the lack of complete information on the
world's genetic resources and the best ways to preserve them.
The Convention, however, presents a positive development that
should benefit the world as a whole, including the United States.
The United States, therefore, should become a party to this
Convention and actively participate in its evolution and
implementation.
Even if the United States does not become a party, the
Convention will remain in force and will evolve. Not only may the
United States lose some of the benefits of participation, but it is

also likely that the Convention will produce new general
international law to which the United States will nevertheless be
required to abide.3 0
Thus, it is hard to imagine that a
dispassionate analysis of the Convention will support any
conclusion other than that the United States ought to become a
party to the Biological Diversity Convention at an early date.

28.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, arts. 16, 17, 18.

29.

Id. arts. 20,21.

30.
See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INTL
L. 529, 543-50 (1993) (discussing a theory for creating general international law).

